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Judge, Egyptian Ministry of Justice
Introduction
The current article is a set
of thoughts, which were put
together; a common denominator
might not exist save as that they
are loud thoughts, generally
related to the judiciary. The first
section of the article is a brief look
at the evolution of the Egyptian
judiciary, especially since the
Islamic era. The second section
deals with divorce by women
of their own will as stipulated in
Law 1 of the year 2000. The third
section discusses a practical
application of the principle nullum
crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine
lege. The final section presents a
subjective view about the judicial
discretion in penalties.
A Historical Background of
the Egyptian Judiciary
A casual observer to the
Hunefer Papyrus, which dates
back to about 1370 B.C., can
easily tell that it represents a trial.
Although the Hunefer Papyrus
represents the trial of Hunefer
on the Day of Reckoning, it
clearly demonstrates that ancient
Egyptians had an advanced
and organized judicial system.
In this Papyrus we can see
"Hunefer kneeling before a table
of offerings in adoration, in the
presence of fourteen gods seated
in order as judges. Below, we see
the Psychostasia, or weighing the
conscience; the jackal-headed
Anubis examines the pointer of
the balance, wherein the heart
(conscience) of the deceased
is being weighed against the
feather, symbolic of law or right
and truth[;] . . . on the right we
see Thoth, the scribe of the gods,
who notes down the result of the
trial."'
The history of the judiciary in
Egypt can be traced back to the
ancient Pharos. However, for the
purpose of understanding the
present status of the Egyptian
judicial system, one needs to
briefly look at the evolution of the
Egyptian judicial system since
the Islamic period, i.e., since
the seventh century. This is due
to the fact that for over eleven
centuries, all the procedures and
legal doctrine in Egypt's judicial
institutions were derived from
Islamic Sharia. Throughout this
period, judges were required
to run the judicial system in
accordance with Islamic rules.
The following incident explains
what is meant by running a judicial
system in accordance with Islamic
rules. After having been appointed
as Yemen's judge, Mu'az ibn
Jabal visited the Prophet (i.e.,
Muhammad) to take permission
before leaving to take up office.
The following conversation took
place: "On what basis shalt thou
decide litigation? According to
the provisions in God's Book
(the Koran)! And if thou doest
not find any provision therein?
Then according to the conduct
of the Messenger of God (i.e.,
Muhammad)! And if thou doest
not find a provision even therein?
Well, then, I shall make an effort
based on my own opinion!" The
Prophet was so delighted by this
reply that, far from reproaching
him, he exclaimed, "Praise be to
God who hath guided the envoy
of His envoy to what pleaseth the
envoy of God!"
During the Islamic era, courts
usually consisted of one judge
who would sit in judgment of
criminal, civil, and family cases.
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That is to say that this judge had a
general ratione materiae within a
specified territory.
In addition to being a religion
regulating the relationship
between God and believers, Islam
is characterized by two main traits.
First, it regulates the conduct
of Muslims in their daily life, i.e.,
criminal matters, commercial
relations, contracts, marriage,
divorce, inheritance, etc. Second,
Islam is applicable for all times
and places. Despite the fact that
there are some immutable rules in
Islam, describing a religion that
has existed nearly 1500 years
with the two aforementioned
characteristics makes it
impossible to speak of completely
rigid regulations.
The two main sources of
Islamic Sharia are the Koran
and the Sunna (the prophet's
tradition). Additionally, there are
other sources that complement
these two main sources: Al-
ljtihad2  (interpretative effort),
AI-qias (analogy), and Al-ljma
(consensus of opinion reached
by early Muslim jurists). Bassiouni
maintains that besides the Koran
and Sunna, other sources of law
render the application of Islam
to contemporary situations
possible.3
To this author, Al-ljtihad is not
only a source that complements
the Koran and Sunna, but it
is one of the main sources
of Islamic Sharia. This view
could be supported by the
above-mentioned conversation
that took place between the
Prophet and the Judge of Yemen.
Additionally, one of the Prophet
said Hadith's4 states: "If a ruler
performed Al-ljtihad then judged
and he was right, he would be
double rewarded, but if he was
mistaken, he would be rewarded
once. 15  The aforementioned
Hadith runs counter to the
normal rules; usually if there is a
reward for doing something right,
there would be a punishment
for doing the same thing wrong.
However, this Hadith speaks of
rewarding the mistaken. This
clearly indicates that the Prophet
is urging us to perform Al-ljtihad.
Islamic Sharia and the
Egyptian Judiciary
Many developments have taken
place in the Egyptian judicial
system since the beginning of the
nineteenth century, each of which
left a mark on the present judicial
system.6 However, to a certain
extent, the Egyptian judicial
system did not lose its Islamic
identity.
Article 2 of the Egyptian
Constitution of 1971 stipulated
that "Islamic Sharia is a principal
source of legislation in Egypt." In
1980, Article 2 was amended to
raise the status of Sharia, stating:
"Islamic Sharia is the principal
source of legislation in Egypt."
Needless to say, this amendment
aimed at bringing all Egyptian
laws in conformity with Islamic
Sharia.
The effect of Article 2 of the
Egyptian Constitution is to impose
limitations on the lawmaker, i.e.,
the lawmaker is not allowed
to enact any law embodying
provisions that contradict
Islamic Sharia. Similarly, this
limitation applies to the Executive
Authority's decrees.
Article 2 of the Egyptian
Constitution caused considerable
turbulence. Many legislative
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enactments were challenged
before the Egyptian Supreme
Constitutional Court on the basis
that they infringed upon Article
2 of the Constitution and Islamic
Sharia.
Law 1 of 2000 was challenged
on the aforementioned grounds.
Before the promulgation of
Law 1 of 2000, divorce was the
husband's privilege. Nevertheless,
the wife could obtain divorce
by a judgment. However, for
the wife to obtain divorce by
judgment she had to provide
proof of darar (damage, injury,
or harm) and convince the judge
that darar took place. Reasons
for obtaining divorce for darar
and lived in misery. Similarly,
the situation was depressing for
judges who sat in the hearings
of such cases, sometimes unable
to act due to procedural and
legislative reasons.
In 1979, Presidential Decree 44
amended Family Law 25 of 1929,
expanding the legal category of
darar in marriage. Presidential
Decree 44 interpreted the mere
fact that a husband takes a
second wife as darar to the first
wife. Thus, the first wife could
obtain a judicial divorce if she
presented proof that her husband
took another wife.7 This decree
was challenged on the basis that
it contradicted Article 2 of the
conditional on the wife forfeiting all
financial legal rights and returning
the dowry she had received
from the husband. However, the
right to child custody and the
children's rights (child support)
are not affected by this type of
divorce, which is called Khula'
in Islamic law (literally meaning
ousting or uprooting). Many
lawyers, scholars, and judges
argued that Khula' runs counter
to Islamic Sharia. Nevertheless,
Khula' is one of the rules provided
by Islamic Sharia, but never
incorporated into legislation.
At this juncture, one should
note that there is a muddle-up
between the Islamic Sharia
The U.S. Supreme Court delivers between 80-90 formal written opinions each Term,
with another 50-60 cases being disposed of without granting plenary review. The
Court's written opinions, including concurring and dissenting opinions, account for an
approximate 5,000 pages per Term.
United States Supreme Court Website, The Justices' Caseload,
at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/justicescaseload.pdf (last visited Apr 20, 2003).
could be systematic abuse or
mistreatment, incurable disease,
lengthy absence or imprisonment,
and non-provision of maintenance.
This is called judicial divorce for
darar. Divorce for darar preserves
all the wife's financial legal rights,
i.e., dowry, alimony, etc.
However, divorce for darar was
much easier said than achieved. I
witnessed a considerable number
of wives struggling in the courts for
over five years to obtain divorce
for darar, and some may not
have obtained it in the end. The
complexity of obtaining divorce
for darar became so famous that
many wives were discouraged
from filing for divorce for darar
Egyptian Constitution since it
contradicted Islamic Sharia. The
Supreme Constitutional Court
of Egypt nullified Presidential
Decree 44 and declared it
unconstitutional on May 4, 1985.
However, this nullification was
based on the lack of adequate
constitutional basis to modify
Family Law 25 of 1929 by means
of a presidential decree.8
The misery continued until Law
1 of 2000 was enacted. I consider
Law 1 of 2000 as the life jacket
that saved the wives drowning in
the choppy sea of family troubles.
According to Law 1 of 2000, a wife
may obtain divorce of her own
will and without proving darar,
and the customs in the Islamic
countries. This is crystal clear
especially in issues related to
women. The Prophet Muhammad
in his last speech spoke about
women, stating: "You people
fear God as to women, I am
commanding you to be courteous
to them."
On December 15, 2002, the
Supreme Constitutional Court
of Egypt declared in a landmark
decision9 that Khula' is in
compliance with Islamic Sharia.
Similarly, this was the view of
the Grand Sheikh of aI-Azhar,10
who proclaimed that Law 1 of
2000 is consistent with Islamic
Sharia. The law was approved
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by a majority vote in the Islamic
Research Academy.
According to a study
presented to the United Nations
Development Program in August
2001, Egypt has one of the most
highly developed and influential
judicial structures in the Arab
world. Thus, I strongly urge Arab
and Islamic countries that do
not apply Khula' to follow the
Egyptian model in applying Law
1 of 2000.
Nullum Crimen Sine Lege
The principle that there must
be no crime or punishment
except in accordance with fixed,
predetermined law, known as
the principle of legality, and in
construed, the prohibition or
limitation on the use of analogy
in judicial interpretation, the
requirement of specificity, and
the prohibition of ambiguity in
criminal legislation.
Although this maxim has been
the basis of criminal law, it is a
matter about which there is a
great difference of opinions. This
difference in opinions begins
with identifying the origins of
the principle and extends to its
application.
The principle nullum crimen
sine Iege is deeply rooted in the
Egyptian judicial traditions. The
Egyptian Court of Cassation, in
several judgments, expressed the
was also embodied in the Islamic
instruments of human rights. For
instance, Article 5 of the Universal
Islamic Declaration of Human
Rights14 stipulates: "Punishment
shall be awarded in accordance
with the Law; ...[and] "No act
shall be considered a crime
unless it is stipulated as such
in the clear wording of the Law."
Similarly, Article 19 of The Cairo
Declaration on Human Rights in
Islam15 stipulates: "There shall be
no crime or punishment except as
provided for in the Shari'ah."
In 1998 while I was working
as a senior prosecutor in the Tax
Evasion Prosecution, I engaged
my peers in a heated discussion
To date, the U.S. Supreme Court has seen 16 Chief Justices and 97 Associate Justices
(three of which went on to become Chief Justices of the Court).
United States Supreme Court Website, Members of the Supreme Court, at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/members.pdf (last visited Apr 20, 2003).
its Latin dress known as nullum
crimen sine lege, nulla poena
sine lege, stands at the very
head of many constitutions and
domestic codes, and has been
included in most of the human
rights instruments as one of the
basic rights and as a self-evident
principle of justice.
The well-known twofold
maxim nullum crimen sine
lege, nulla poena sine lege, has
different aspects. It includes the
prohibition against ex post facto
criminal laws and its derivative
rule of non-retroactive application
of criminal laws and criminal
sanctions. Moreover, the maxim
has four important corollaries:
penal statutes must be strictly
780 Denver University Law Review
view that it is absolutely prohibited
to widen the interpretation of text
in criminal legislation. It even went
further by holding that the rule
against retroactive legislation is
a basic principle of jurisprudence
that should be considered by the
legislature; otherwise, the judge
should refrain from applying
laws enacted contrary to that
rule.1 In the Islamic Sharia, the
principle of nullum crimen sine
lege can be best illustrated by
the following verses of the Koran:
"We never punish until we have
sent a Messenger,"12 and "Your
Lord would never destroy cities
without first sending to the chief
of them a Messenger to recite Our
Signs to them."13 The principle
concerning the application of a
tax provision. The law defines
tax evasion as any one of 6
exhaustive fraudulent means
or acts triggering potential
imprisonment. The sixth act was
the failure to disclose one or more
of the activities that is subject to
taxation.
Meanwhile, the same law
considers the non-presentation of
the tax return as a misdemeanor
charged by a fine. Thus, those
who do not present their tax
returns are legally in a better
position than those who present
an incomplete tax return. Abuse
of the flawed law followed.
My colleagues expressed
the view that those who do not




present their tax returns should
be indicted for a felony under the
law for failure to disclose activities
that are subject to taxation. They
argued that fraud was satisfied
and strict application would
deter continued activity. I argued
that those tax violators were
aware of and had accepted the
punishment prescribed for their
tax code violation and could
not be indicted under another
provision that aggravates the
punishment of the original
violation. I believe that additional
punishment would violate the
principle of nullum crimen sine
lege. The presiding judges
shared my view, thus triggering a
legislative amendment.
A Subjective View on
the Judicial Discretion in
Penalties
In the application of the law,
very few legal provisions are so
phrased that the judges are left
completely devoid of discretion.
This is because legal notions
often have to cover a variety of
legal situations (usually difficult
to enumerate considering other
social and moral concepts).
Thus, a provision of a law might
provide for a set of penalties for
the committing of a certain act or
omission, leaving the judge wide
discretion to decide the suitable
penalty.
If any of these penalties are
so harsh that it is obviously
disproportionate to the violation,
it becomes an inoperative penalty
or provision, since the judge
does not apply it. After a certain
period of non-application of this
provision, it would be peculiar to
subsequently apply it. To what
limit may a judge abide by this
customary non-appliance?
Let us first discuss the
implication of non-application
of a certain provision of law.
Clarification of this implication
will unfold considering the
following incident that took place
recently in Ireland. "I don't think
any Nigerian is obeying the law
of the land when it comes to
driving. I had a few of them in
Galway yesterday and they are all
driving around without insurance
and the way to stop this is to
put you in jail. '' 16 Judge Harvey
Kenny made this statement while
a Nigerian woman was appearing
in his court on a charge of driving
without insurance.
Section 56 of the Irish Traffic
Act of 1961 provides for 3 types
of penalties for driving without
insurance. Those penalties include
a fine; or, at the discretion of the
court, imprisonment; or both a fine
and imprisonment. Nevertheless,
imprisonment is not the usual
penalty for merely driving without
insurance. I consulted some Irish
citizens outside the judicial and
legal sphere, asking them their
opinion on a judge imprisoning
someone for merely driving
without insurance. Some of them
expressed the view that this
would constitute inequality, since
this is not the usual penalty, while
other citizens stated that this is
not in the penalty prescribed for
driving without insurance as they
believed the penalty was either a
fine or disqualification.
Applying such a provision is
not in violation of the principle of
legality. Additionally, arguments
could be raised to bring into
play the principle that ignorance
of law is no excuse. On the
other hand, one could counter
argue that this is a violation of
the essence of legality. This
argument could be based on the
fact that consistently applying
a certain penalty for a certain
violation automatically induces an
impression to the addressees that
this is the penalty prescribed for
this violation. However, consistent
non-application of a certain
provision induces the contrary
effect to the addressees, i.e., that
this provision does not exist.
In sum, within a personal
parameter, it is preferable that
judges remain within the remit
of the customary application of
penalties, especially in cases
where a certain penalty is
disproportionate to the conduct
in question.
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